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Re: Schwartz VS. Intel
In article <3u3mhg$ipl@linda.teleport.com>,
Tom Cronin <cronin@teleport.com> wrote:
>In article <3u3lq9$aa5@maureen.teleport.com>,
>Darrell Fuhriman <darrell@teleport.com> wrote:
>>Intel complains that Schwartz was violating their security, but I
>>would assert that any system that has non-shadowed passwords has
>>no security.
>So, using your argument on in a non-computing paradigm:
> Given that wafer locks are blindingly easy to pick, if I enter a
> building protected by a wafer lock by picking the lock, I'm not guilty
> of breaking and entering, since wafer locks are so easy to pick that
> they're not really secure at all.
Poor analogy. A better one would be looking at a building and checking
the doors to see what kind of locks are on them, with the intention of
telling the building manager that wafer locks were unsafe.
A better parallel to breaking and entering is using the information
gleaned from the analysis of the password file to login to an account.
--
Joshua R. Poulson, jrp@pun.org, http://www.pun.org/~jrp
"finger -l jrp@teleport.com" for PGP public key
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