IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON FOR WASHINGTON COUNTY STATE OF OREGON, ) ) Case No. C940322CR Plaintiff, ) ) MEMORANDUM OF LAW v. ) SUPPORTING ) DEMURRER RANDAL LEE SCHWARTZ, ) ) Defendant. ) I. THE FACTS STATED IN THE INDICTMENT DO NOT CONSTITUTE AN OFFENSE, BECAUSE THE TERMS "ALTER" AND "WITHOUT AUTHORITY" IN ORS 164.377(3) ARE UNCONSTITUTIONALLY VAGUE. A demurrer to an indictment on the ground that the facts stated do not constitute an offense pursuant to ORS 135.630(4) is the procedural mechanism for raising a constitutional challenge to the vagueness of a criminal statute. If a statute is unconstitutionally vague, the facts alleged in an indictment under that statute do not and cannot constitute an offense. State v. McKenzie, 307 Or 554, 560, 771 P2d 264 (1989). Mr. Schwartz is charged in Count 1, that he did "alter" a computer and computer network without authorization in violation of ORS 164.377(3). If either of the terms "alter" or "authorization" is unconstitutionally overbroad, vague or both, the charge cannot stand. State authority The prohibition against vague criminal laws rests upon various constitutional grounds. A criminal statute must not be so vague as to permit a judge or jury to exercise uncontrolled discretion in punishing a defendant, since this would violate the principle against ex post facto laws embodied in Article I, section 21, of the Oregon Constitution. State v. Graves, 299 Or 189, 195, 700 P2d 244 (1985); State v. Cornell/Pinnell, 304 Or. 27, 29-30, 741 P2d 501 (1987); State v. Moeller, 105 Or App 434, 806 P2d 130 (1991) review dismissed 312 Or 76 (1991). The test for determining whether statutory language is unconstitutionally vague under the Constitution of the State of Oregon, Article 1 Sections 20 and 21, was enunciated by the Supreme Court in State v. Hodges, 254 Or 21, 27, 457 P2d 491 (1969): "A law that permits the judge and jury to punish or withhold punishment in their uncontrolled discretion is defective as much for its uncertainty of adjudication as for its failure to notify potential defendants of its scope and reach. "...A vague statute lends itself to an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power to the judge and jury, and, by permitting the jury to decide what the law will be it offends the principle, if not the rule, against ex post facto laws. See Oregon Constitution, Art. I s.21" See, also, State v. Cornell/Pinnell, 304 Or 27, 29-30, 741 P2d 501 (1987); City of Portland v. Levi, 98 Or App 341, 779 P2d 192, on recons. 100 Or App 349, 786 P2d 196 rev.den. 309 Or 645, 789 P2d 1387 (1989); State v. Blair, 287 Or 519, 521-23, 601 P2d 766 (1979). Article I, section 20, the equal privileges and immunities clause, of the Oregon Constitution is also offended when a vague penal law allows a judge or jury uncontrolled discretion to decide what is prohibited in a given case--for this results in the standardless and unequal application of criminal laws. State v. Graves, supra, 299 Or at 195; State v. Robertson, 293 Or 402, 408, 649 P2d 569 (1982). State v. Henry, 78 Or App 392, 717 P2d 189, rev.allowed 301 Or 666, 725 P2d 1293, affirmed 302 Or 510, 732 P2d 9 (1986). Although a criminal statute need not define an offense with such precision that a person in every case can determine in advance what specific conduct will fall within that statute's purview, "a reasonable degree of certainty is required by Article I sections 20 and 21." State v. Graves, supra, 299 0r at 195. For, it is essential that the terms of the statute be sufficiently explicit to inform those who may be subject to its provisions what conduct will render them liable to its penalties. Id. Persons of ordinary intelligence must be able to determine what specific conduct falls within the prohibition of a criminal statute, State v. Knobel, 97 Or App 559, 777 P2d 985 rev.den. 309 Or 522, 798 P2d 1387 (1989), State v. Hodges, 254 Or 21, 457 P2d 491 (1969), without being required to guess at the meaning of the statute; otherwise, the statute is unconstitutionally vague. State v. Debnam, 23 Or App 433, 542 P2d 939 (1975); State v. Sanderson, 33 Or App 173, 575 P2d 1027 (1977) See, also, ORS 161.025(1). In State v. Graves, 299 Or 189, 700 P2d 244 (1985), the phrase "commonly used" in "commonly used for committing or facilitating a forced entry" to describe burglar tools in an enhancement provision was ruled impermissibly vague in violation of Article I, Sections 20 and 21 of the Oregon Constitution for precisely that reason. The potential for vastly different treatment of persons in essentially the same posture due to the caprice of prosecutors and/or jurors was enormous, as was the potential for ex post facto application of the law. In State v. Sanderson, supra, a statute that prohibited "Engag[ing] in a course of conduct that alarms or seriously annoys another person and which serves no legitimate purpose" was held to be unconstitutionally vague, because it did not distinguish between socially tolerable conduct, i.e., consistently appearing late for social appointments, and criminal conduct, such as obscene telephone calls. So a law may be vague if it criminally proscribes conduct which is socially tolerable as well as conduct which is not. One year later, a statute which prohibited communicating with the specific intent to "harass, annoy or alarm another person" was held to be unconstitutionally vague by the Supreme Court in State v. Blair, 287 Or 519, 601 P2d 766 (1979). The Court of Appeals had relied upon the specification of intent to save the statute, but the Supreme Court said that "specification of the element of intent does nothing to define what someone who wishes to harass, annoy or alarm another may not do in pursuit of that disagreeable aim." 287 Or at 523. Federal authority On the federal level, a criminal statute which fails to provide fair notice of the conduct prohibited runs afoul of the due process clause in the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. "[A] law fails to meet the requirements of the Due Process Clause if it is so vague and standardless that it leaves... judges and jurors free to decide, without any legally fixed standards, what is prohibited and what is not in each particular case .... " Giaccio v. Pennsylvania, 382 US 399, 402-403, 86 S Ct 518, 15 L Ed 2d 447 (1966). In Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 US 451, 59 SCt 618, 83 LEd 888 (1939), the United States Supreme Court held: ". . . a statute which . . . forbids . . . the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application violates the first essential of due process of law." 306 US at 453. In Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 US 104 (1972), the Supreme Court articulated the constitutional objections to vague laws as follows: "Vague laws offend several important values. First, because we assume that man is free to steer between lawful and unlawful conduct, we insist that laws give the person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what is prohibited, so that he may act accordingly. Vague laws may trap the innocent by not providing fair warning. Second, if arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement is to be prevented, laws must provide explicit standards for those who apply them. A vague law impermissibly delegates basic policy matters to policemen, judges, and juries for resolution on an ad hoc and subjective basis, with the attendant dangers of arbitrary and discriminatory applications. (footnotes omitted.)" 1408 US at 108. Saving Interpretation A criminal statute which is subject to a vagueness challenge for failing to define and communicate its coverage can be saved by a judicial interpretation that provides the necessary definiteness. State v. Graves, supra, 299 Or at 197. However, the interpretation must be consistent with the actual wording of the statute and the legislature's apparent intent. State v. Roberston, supra, 293 Or at 409, 411. The narrowing construction cannot be legislative in character. State v. Moeller, 105 Or App 434, 441, 806 P2d 130, review dismissed 312 Or 76 (1991). A scienter requirement is frequently employed to mitigate the vagueness. In State v. Yancey, 32 Or App 477, 574 P2d 358 (1977), the Court of Appeals saved the "Possession of Gambling Records Statute," [ORS 167.132] which prohibits, "with knowledge of the contents thereof, [possession of] any writing, paper, instrument or article: (a) Of a kind commonly used in the operation or promotion of a bookmaking scheme or enterprise; . . ." To avoid the allegation of vagueness, the "knowledge" element was held to apply both to the possession element and to the common use element. That is, the state would be required to prove that the possessor knew the contents of what he had and that he knew that those contents were "of a kind commonly used in the operation or promotion of a bookmaking scheme or enterprise; . . ." That is, as a practical matter, a heavy burden to carry. The essential question in this case is whether either or both of the terms "alter" and "without authorization" as used in ORS 164.377(3) are unconstitutionally vague, and, if so, whether it is possible to arrive at a proper judicial narrowing construction. Cf. State v. Cornell/Pinnell, 304 Or 27, 31-32, 741 P2d 501 (1987) ("torture" as used in ORS 163.095(1)(c) saved from vagueness challenge by judicial interpretation); and, State v. Moeller, supra, 105 Or App at 439-41 ("scheme and network" language under state sentencing guidelines impermissibly vague and not subject to proper narrowing construction). The terms "alter" and "without authorization". The word "alter" is not defined in ORS 164.377(1), which is the section of the criminal code that defines the terms that designate computer crime. Nor is the term "authorization" defined. Oregon case law is similarly devoid of a judicial definition of the terms. The legislative history is not enlightening as to what conduct the legislature intended to cover by reference to either the term "alter" or "without authority" in the context of this statute. However, the term "access" is defined in ORS 164.377(1)(a) as "to instruct, communicate with, store data in, retrieve data from or otherwise make use of any resources of a computer, computer system or computer network." The term "alter" must mean something else. Otherwise, its inclusion in the statute is a meaningless or redundant act. The courts are generally not empowered to view an act of the legislature as meaningless or redundant. ORS 174.010; 1000 Friends of Oregon v. Wasco Co., 399 Or 344, 703 P2d 207 (1985); Union Pacific R. Co. v. Bean, 167 Or 534, 119 P2d 575 (1942). "Alter" may be given its normal, well-recognized meaning. It generally means to change or "to make different." The Merriam- Webster Dictionary. "Alteration" is defined as "a change of a thing from one form or state to another, making a thing different from what it was without destroying its identity." Black's Law Dictionary, 5th Edition, page 40. But if that is the construction adopted, it is so all- encompassing that its effect is to criminalize both socially tolerable and socially intolerable conduct. Virtually any entry on the computer could be a crime. For instance, the installing and playing of computer games, by employees, on the company hard disc over the lunch hour without the express permission of the employer is clearly within this meaning of the statute. That behavior, however, is most emphatically not an appropriate focus of the criminal law. This "well-recognized meaning" construction of the word "alter" illuminates another problem with the statute: There is no requirement that anyone be harmed. One of the consistent symptoms of criminal laws which are unconstitutionally vague is that there is no requirement that harm occur. That was one of the flaws in the statute invalidated in State v. Blair, supra. The Supreme Court said: Examination of paragraph (c) shows that the communication proscribed by the statute need not cause any harm at all, in the form of annoyance, alarm., or otherwise. It is sufficient if the manner of communication is in fact "likely" to do so, . . . 287 Or at 524. Also, see State v. Ray, 302 Or 595, 599, 733 P2d 28 (1987) and State v. Spencer, 289 Or 225, 611 P2d 1147 (1980). Finally, if the word "alter" simply means "change," it is difficult to distinguish that normal, well-recognized meaning from at least some of the meanings given by the legislature to the word "access." Typing even one letter or number on the keyboard of a computer that is on and is in functional condition uses its resources, regardless of whether it is running a word-processing program, a graphics program, a spreadsheet or a CAD program. Storing data "changes" the computer. The only conceivable construction that could save the statute is to read the word "alter" to mean: "To permanently erase data from the memory of the computer, computer system or computer network." Any other construction either 1) runs afoul of the definition of the statutory term "access" (which includes to store data IN the memory or retrieve it, but does not include to erase it) or 2) it leaves the reader so far out at sea that he has no idea what behavior violates the statute and what behavior does not. The first option is not available because it requires the court to declare either the term "alter" or the term "access" redundant. Given the second option, the statute is unconstitutionally vague. The difficulty with the "erasure" construction is that if the legislature had erasure in mind, the statute could easily have included that term. It did not, and the courts are strictly limited in what they may do by way of limiting construction. In a word, they may not legislate. State v. Robertson, supra; State v. Moeller, supra. In Galley v. Babb, infra, at 50 Or App 628, the court said: When a legislative enactment is challenged as unconstitutionally vague, it is our obligation to interpret the statute, if possible, in a manner which will result in a finding of constitutionality. [Citations omitted]. But that obligation does not require us to engage in tortured analysis or to amend the enactment by inserting definitions and limitations not adopted through the legislative process or to delete terms enacted. The term "authorization" is also, as previously noted, undefined. To authorize, of course, generally means "to give a right or authority to act" or "to permit a thing to be done in the future." Black's Law Dictionary, 5th Edition, page 69. "Authority" is seen as "permission." Ibid, page 68. Black's Law Dictionary lists a number of kinds of "authority," including apparent authority, authority by estoppel, authority coupled with an interest, general authority, implied authority, incidental authority, inherent authority, limited authority, special authority and naked authority. The problem inherent in ORS 164.377 is that it neither designates what sort of "authorization" is required, nor does it identify the source from which the authorization must originate. This omission distinguishes ORS 164.377(3) from virtually every other section of the Oregon Revised Statutes where the term "authorization" is used to mean "permission." For example, ORS 30.182 provides for a civil action by a utility for, among other things, "(2) [M]ak[ing], or caus[ing] to be made, any connection or reconnection with property owned or used by the utility to provide utility service without the authorization or consent of the utility; . . ." (Emphasis added). A foreign professional corporation may transact business in this state only after obtaining, among other things, "[A]uthorization to transact business in this state from the Secretary of State. ORS 58.129(1)(b) (Emphasis added). An arrest warrant must be in writing and may: Specify that the arresting officer may enter premises, in which the officer has probable cause to believe the person to be arrested to be present, without giving notice of the officer's authority and purpose, if the issuing judge has approved a request for such special authorization; . . . ORS 133.140(7) (Emphasis added). And if appointed counsel in a criminal case is to collect his fee on the case, ORS 135.055 requires, among other things: (c) The presiding judge may authorize the clerk of the court to make the certification required under this section in some or all cases where the amount for payment meets the cost guidelines and standards established pursuant to ORS 151.430 (5) and (6). The authorization must be in writing and must specify the types of cases to which the authorization applies. (Emphasis added) See Appendix A for a list of the statutes involving the term "authorization" and the respective, designated source(s) of the authorization(s) required. By contrast, ORS 164.377 contains no standards for the determination, on any objective basis, of who was authorized to do what and by whom, or what sort of authorization is required. So the reader is left to guess, at his peril, whose permission he must seek if he is to "change" the data in the memory of a computer, and, in addition, what sort of permission it must be if he is to be safe from criminal prosecution. If he guesses wrong, prosecution may ensue (but maybe not). This is not tenable under either the Constitution of the State of Oregon or the Constitution of the United States. State v. Graves, supra; Giaccio v. Pennsylvania, supra. It is another signal of unconstitutional vagueness. Grayned v. City of Rockford, supra. Not knowing from whence the requisite authorization must come, it is impossible to determine what kind of authorization it must be. Will apparent authority constitute a defense? Is implied authority enough? The statute contains no clue. In Galley v. Babb, 50 Or App 617, 624 P2d 616, rev. den. 291 Or 117 (1981), an ordinance banning drug paraphernalia was struck down as unconstitutionally vague. The court said: The city argues that the generality of the description can be cured by expert testimony at a trial for violation of the ordinance. The contention appears to be that recognized experts can determine if a particular item is used or intended for use in the illegal preparation or administration of drugs. By this method, the city argues, a judge or jury can be informed as to the character of the item the accused is charged with manufacturing, selling or delivering. The difficulty with that argument is that it is the antithesis of the requirement that a penal ordinance or statute inform the public and law enforcement personnel of the standard of conduct required. The ordinary citizen should not have to depend on the testimony of an expert at trial to determine if his conduct is prohibited by the ordinance. The law enforcement agencies must also have standards of enforcement in order that enforcement of the ordinance will not be arbitrary or capricious. Expert testimony presented in the adversary setting of a trial does not provide standards for the persons whose conduct is sought to be regulated or the police charged with enforcement of the ordinance. 50 Or App at 629. Second, the potential for criminal prosecutions based on after-the-fact, ad hoc decisions by middle level corporate managers, among others, makes this term particularly susceptible to ex post facto application due to the lack of definition and standards. This potential is one of the main signals of fatal vagueness. State v. Graves, supra. II. COUNT 1 OF THE INDICTMENT IS NOT DEFINITE AND CERTAIN, BECAUSE THE TERMS "ALTER" AND "AUTHORIZATION" IN ORS 164.377(3) ARE UNCONSTITUTIONALLY VAGUE. In the alternative, without waiving any of the arguments set out above, defendant contends that the Demurrer to Count 1 of the indictment must be granted because it is not definite and certain. ORS 135.630(6) establishes ground for a demurrer when an indictment is not definite and certain. See, State v. Cooper, 78 Or App 237 (1986). In Cooper, the Court of Appeals noted that the specificity requirement for indictments has both a statutory basis in ORS 133.015(7), and a constitutional underpinning found in Article I, Section 11 of the Oregon Constitution and the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. 78 Or App at 239-40. Article I, Section 11 of the Oregon Constitution provides that an accused has the right to demand the nature and cause of the accusation against him. See, State v. Green, 245 OR 318 III.(1966), State v. Cooper, Supra, State v. Jim/White, 13 Or App 201 (1973). The due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires that an indictment describe an offense with sufficient precision and certainty to enable a presumptively innocent person to prepare for trial. Barber v. Gladden, 327 F2d 101 (9th Cir.), cert den 377 US 971 (1964), State v. Cooper, Supra, 78 Or App at 239-40. In State v.Sanders, 280 Or 685 (1977) the Oregon Supreme Court held that the availability of discovery may not save an unspecific accusatory instrument from a challenge on specificity grounds. With respect to a burglary indictment, the Court held that the accusatory instrument must also specify the crime the accused allegedly intended to commit at the time of the alleged entry. Because the indictment failed to specify the crime, it was subject to demurrer on the ground that it was not definite and certain. In State v. Cooper, Supra, the Court of Appeals affirmed a trial court order sustaining a demurrer to a complaint on the grounds that the complaint was not definite and certain and failed to state an offense. Although plead in the terms of the statute, the complaint did not set out the specific facts that the State intended to rely upon to prove a violation of the statute. 78 Or App at 240-41. For the reasons discussed in Section I of the memorandum, the terms "alter" and "without authorization" in ORS 164.377(3) are unconstitutionally vague. As a corollary to their vagueness, the allegation in Count 1, that defendant ". . .did unlawfully, knowingly and without authorization alter a computer and computer network. . .", lacks the requisite specificity to provide defendant with the degree of notice of the specific criminal conduct the State intends to prove to enable him to prepare his defense for trial. Barber v. Gladden, supra, State v. Kincaid, 78 Or App 23 (1986). The terms "alter" and "without authorization" as used in ORS 164.377(3) cannot be saved by a judicial interpretation because the statute has no foundations upon which to base a narrowing construction as that which existed in State v. Yancey, supra. Indeed, because the common usage of both terms is so broad, there is nothing in Oregon law to provide guidance for an interpretation of the terms and this court would be required to fashion a definition which would be tantamount to legislating. This is clearly not constitutionally permissible. State v. Robertson, supra; State v. Moeller, supra. III. COUNT 1 IS NOT DEFINITE AND CERTAIN BECAUSE IT DOES NOT DISTINGUISH MENTAL STATE FROM ELEMENT ORS 161.095 requires, for the attachment of criminal liability in Oregon, a voluntary act or omission of which the actor is capable. Second, excepting situations listed in ORS 161.105, no one is guilty of an offense unless the act or omission is done with a culpable mental state "with respect to each material element of the offense that necessarily requires a culpable mental state." ORS 161.105 excepts, from that rule, 1) violations (unless a culpable mental state is required by the definition of the offense) and 2) offenses defined outside the Oregon Criminal Code which show a clear legislative intent to dispense with the requirement of a culpable mental state. The statute in question is virtually unique in that one of the elements seems to be, in addition to that, a culpable mental state. That element is "without authorization." The statute prohibits, and Count 1 charges, alteration of a computer and computer system "knowingly and without authorization." It would seem simpler to argue that this results in the count not stating an offense because of the general statutory scheme requiring one of the listed culpable mental states outlined above, or that the count charges only a violation. That would be specious because of the allegation that the act was done knowingly. Does the statute prohibit (and the count allege) that the alteration was done knowingly, that the lack of authorization (if any) was known, or both? Is it a defense if the actor believed, in good faith, that the alteration was authorized or that what he was doing would not "alter" the computer? Who knows? IV. THE STATUTE IN QUESTION IS OVERBROAD There is, as a practical matter, some theoretical overlap between the doctrines of vagueness and overbreadth, and it is easy to see that the two doctrines may become confused. The decision in State v. Sanderson, supra, might well have been an overbreadth decision, since the vice of the law was that it failed to distinguish between criminal and non-criminal conduct, and the legislature may not criminalize by such a broad stroke that the stroke may (or may not, depending on the whim of the prosecutor or jury) include socially tolerable conduct. The distinction is that if a law is fatally vague, one cannot determine its metes and bounds and its sweep, necessarily covers behavior which is essentially non-criminal (socially tolerable), whereas in the case of overbreadth, the conduct is "tolerable" because it is protected by a constitutional provision. There is a discussion of this contrast in State v. Robertson, 293 Or 402, 649 P2d 569 (1982), where the Supreme Court distinguished between the doctrines of "vagueness" and "overbreadth:" "Overbreadth," however, is a different claim. It should be kept in mind that the terms "overbroad" and "overbreadth" are not themselves terms of the state or federal constitutions, any more than the terms "vague" or "vagueness"; they are only lawyers' phrases for shortcomings that are claimed to contravene other constitutional constraints. The have been used by different theorists and courts to mean different things and to carry different consequences. [Omitting citation]. In principle, however, a claim of "overbreadth" asserts that the terms of a law exceed constitutional boundaries, * * * An "overbroad" law, as that term has been developed by the United States Supreme Court, is not vague, or need not be. Its vice is not failure to communicate. Its vice may be clarity. For a law is overbroad to the extent that it announces a prohibition that reaches conduct which may not be prohibited. A legislature can make a law as "broad" and inclusive as it chooses unless it reaches into constitutionally protected ground. The clearer an "overbroad" statute is, the harder it is to confine it by interpretation within its constitutionally permissible borders. [Citing State v. Blocker, 291 Or 255, 261, 630 P2d 824 (1981)]. Ibid, at 293 Or 410. If there is to be a serious challenge based on an overbreadth argument, then, some constitutionally protected interest must be involved. The Constitution of the State of Oregon, Article I, section 8, prohibits the state legislature from passing any law that "restrain[s] the free expression of opinion, or restrict[s] the right to speak, write, or print freely on any subject whatever." In Moser v. Frohnmayer, 315 Or 372, 845 P2d 1284 (1993), the Oregon Supreme Court had an opportunity to address the Oregon Constitutional implications of communication by computer: The Oregon Constitution protects communication by one person to another in words, whether that communication is by face-to-face speech, by person-to-person voice communication through wires or through the air, or by the computerized simulation of spoken words. The fact that one's means of expression is by a recording or simulation of one's voice does not alter its essential nature - speech. Ibid, at 305 Or 375. Consequently, if the prohibition in ORS 164.377 which is being employed to prosecute the defendant here is so broad as to prevent any "change" of whatever kind to any computer or computer network, it is so broad as to cross the barrier which protects free expression from inhibition by the legislature. An analogy to the mail may be of benefit: Private concerns may certainly regulate the use of their facilities and resources by their employees. Moreover, those concerns may prohibit their employees from using their place(s) of business to send personal mail or to engage in political conduct or any number of other things. But the state legislature may not criminalize behavior in those categories, because to do so infringes on the inherent rights of the citizenry to speak, write and communicate freely. Those rights exist independent of any employment status, and may not be significantly burdened by the government. Government may regulate certain kinds of expression, such as commercial expression. Regulations, and even prohibitions, may be upheld if they are directed at the content of communication and the scope of the restraint is "wholly confined within some historical exception that was well established when the first American guarantees of freedom of expression were adopted and that the guarantees then or in 1859 demonstrably were not intended to reach." State v. Robertson, supra, 293 Or at 412. The restraint involved here goes far beyond that. Another kind of restraint on communications focuses on forbidding the results of the communications. That kind of restraint can be directed at the expression that produces the effect or at the effect itself. If it is in the first category, it must be analyzed to determine whether it reaches protected expression under Article 1 Section 8 or whether it can be saved by a limiting construction. If it is of the second kind, a person accused of causing such effects is limited, in his overbreadth charge, to alleging that the restraint cannot constitutionally be applied to his alleged conduct. State v. Plowman, supra, 314 Or 164. The difficulty with the statute in question here is that it is impossible to take the first step in the analysis, because to enter any data at all on a computer is to change, hence to "alter" it. The statute can easily be read to punish the entry, into an employee or contractor E-mail directory, of a political message with which the management does not agree (and which is, thus, "unauthorized"). The management may prohibit such activity, but the legislature may not make it a crime because it is constitutionally protected, socially tolerable conduct. In City of Hillsboro v. Purcell, 306 Or 547, 553-554, 556, 761 P2d 510 (1988) Hillsboro had passed a "Green River" ordinance. The Supreme Court said: The nature of the prohibition, either civil or criminal, is immaterial to the first sentence of Article I, section 8, which directs that "no law" shall restrict or restrain speech, writing and printing. We have made distinctions between civil and criminal remedies with regard to an "abuse" of speech or writing and held that civil remedies but not criminal may redress "abuses" of these rights. Lewis v. Oregon Beauty Supply Co., 302 Or 616, 733 P2d 430 (1987); Bank of Oregon v. Independent News, 298 Or 434, 693 P2d 35 (1985); In re Lasswell, 296 Or 121, 673 P2d 855 (1983); Hall v. The May Dept. Stores, 292 Or 131, 145-46, 637 P2d 126 (1981); Wheeler v. Green, 286 Or 99, 593 P2d 777 (1979). These cases, with the exception of Lasswell, concern abuses after they cause damage, and in Lasswell the attorney disciplinary rule prohibiting prosecutors from commenting publicly on an ongoing investigation or trial was based on incompatibility with the prosecutor's function and was held to require a highly likely effect. 296 Or at 126. With regard to prohibitions on speech or writing before some completed abuse of these rights, we have held that government, with few historical exceptions, cannot prohibit speech outright by making it a crime. State v. Robertson, 293 Or 402, 649 P2d 569 (1982); State v. Spencer, 289 Or 225, 611 P2d 1147 (1980). Neither may it do so through civil prohibitions. City of Portland v. Welch, 229 Or 308, 320, 364 P2d 1009, 367 P2d 403 (1961) (on rehearing, unrestrained, unguided discretion to grant licenses can be a prior restraint prohibited by Article I, section 8); see also Ivancie v. Thornton, 250 Or 550, 557, 443 P2d 612 (1968) (First Amendment prohibits governments from restricting speech by taxes, license, punishment or withholding of benefits). * * * * The ordinance is overbroad, not because it regulates solicitation for one purpose differently from another, but because it prohibits all solicitation for any purpose at any time. The ordinance as written is broad enough to preclude any person or group from approaching a door in a residential neighborhood to solicit financial support for any purpose through the sale of merchandise. This is far more than a regulation limited to and contained by the consequences the law seeks to prevent.[Footnote Omitted]. (Emphasis added). Though we have on occasion narrowed an overbroad statute to the constitutional confines intended by lawmakers, see, e.g., State v. Moyle, [299 Or 691, 705 P2d 740 (1985)], we are unable to discern the intended boundaries of this ordinance. Likewise, the intended boundaries of ORS 164.377(3) are indiscernible, if any there be. The statute is unconstitutionally overbroad on its face. In conclusion, and for the foregoing reasons, defendant's Motion to Dismiss Count I of the indictment, or, alternatively, his Demurrer, should be allowed. COURNOYER & SUSSMAN By: Marc Sussman, OSB#77368 Attorneys for Defendant APPENDIX TO DEMURRER I. Introduction This appendix designates the Oregon Revised Statutes in which the word "authorization" appears. The word occurs 613 times, including tables of contents, indexes and annotations. Tables of contents, indexes and annotations are not included this appendix. Where the word appears only in subsections, the subsection designation has been included. All the statutory intricacies were thought to be beyond the scope of this index, which is intended only to demonstrate that, overwhelmingly, where authorization is required by the code, the source of the authorization required, and frequently the type of authorization required, is specified. 9.840 Provides that resolution passed at county court meeting in smaller counties authorizes maintenance of law library. 23.445 Provides for court authorization for sale of residence. 25.255(6) Allows the custodial parent or guardian of an insured dependent to authorize payment to the provider of the health services. 30.182 Provides for civil action for taking of or tampering with utility services for diversion of utility services if not authorized by utility. 30.268 Limits liability for certain medical treatment at facilities other than Oregon Health Sciences University if under prior written express authorization from the President of the Oregon Health Sciences University or a representative of the president to provide those services at that location. 33.720 Allows the city council, board of commissioners, board of directors, county court or other managing board of a municipal corporation including a board managing a municipally owned public utility or a dock commission to file suit regarding the authorization of any contract and as to the validity of the contract, whether or not it has been executed. 35.265 Allows a state agency as public condemner to authorize an advancement out of funds available to the agency of the amount estimated by the agency to be just compensation for the property sought to be condemned. 58.129 et seq. Requires foreign professional corporations to secure authorization of Secretary of State before doing business in Oregon. Certificate from Secretary of State constitutes authorization to do business. 60.027 et seq. Requires domestic private and professional corporations to secure authorization of Secretary of State before doing business in Oregon. Certificate from Secretary of State constitutes authorization to do business. 60.164 Allows the board of directors of a corporation to issue some or all of the shares of any or all of its classes or series without certificates. 60.181 Allows board of directors to authorize and the corporation to make distributions to its shareholders subject to restriction by the articles of incorporation and statutes. 60.397 Provides for an advance for expenses to corporate director if authorized by provision in the articles of incorporation, or bylaws, by a resolution of the shareholders or board of directors or by contract. 60.404 Restricts corporations power to authorize indemnity of director. 60.634 Designates means whereby revocation of corporate dissolution may be authorized - requires action by board of directors. 60.704 Prohibits a foreign corporation doing business without authorization from Secretary of State from maintaining action in state court. 62.065 Provides for authorization to do business as cooperative by Secretary of State. 62.435 Allows controlling board to authorize sale, lease, exchange or other disposition of assets of cooperative when made in regular course of business. 63.027 Provides that Secretary of State may issue certificate of existence for a domestic limited liability company or a certificate of authorization for a foreign limited liability company. Provides that a certificate of existence or authorization issued by the Secretary of State may be relied upon as conclusive evidence that the domestic or foreign limited liability company is in existence or is authorized to transact business in this state. 63.704 Limits access to courts for a foreign limited liability company doing business without authorization from Secretary of State. 65.001 "Definitions. As used in this chapter, unless otherwise specifically provided: (38) `Vote' includes authorization by written ballot and written consent, where permitted." 65.027 Provides that the Secretary of State may authorize a domestic or foreign corporation to do business in this state. 65.397 Allows the board of directors, bylaws or articles of incorporation of a non-profit corporation to authorize reimbursement of expenses incurred by a director. 65.404 Controls methods of authorization of director indemnification. 65.634 Allows revocation of dissolution in same manner in which revocation was authorized in first place. 65.704 Limits court access for foreign corporations transacting business without authorization from Secretary of State. 65.714 Allows foreign corporation same privileges as domestic corporation given authorization to do business from Secretary of State. 73.0103 Defines "order" in negotiable instruments law and includes authorization to pay. Defines "presenter" as person acting under an issuer's authorization. 92.425 Establishes conditions prerequisite to sale of real estate, including allowing escrow only as authorized by law (legislative authorization). 94.871 Limits sale of timeshare estates by developers; requires escrow with person or firm legally authorized to receive escrows. 97.141 Legislative authorization of cemetery authority to inter or cremate remains. 97.150 Legislative authorization for disposition of cremated remains. 97.620 In case of death of coowner, legislative authorization to use plot under directions of surviving owners. 100.720 Conditions prerequisite to sale of condominium, requires escrow to be established with a person or firm authorized to receive escrows under the laws of this state. 107.600 Requires written authorization of judge for inspection of reconciliation agreement between spouses. 109.116 Establishes validity of authorization, release or waiver given by the putative father with reference to the custody or adoption of the child or the termination of parental rights. 109.318 Provides for consent to adoption by agency or organization outside state acting in loco parentis to child; allows consent by person authorized to act for agency. 133.724 Requires court to authorize order for interception of communications, limits duration. 135.055 Requires court to authorize compensation and expenses of appointed counsel. 137.452 Allows the attorney general to authorize district attorney to issue satisfaction of money judgment, but does not require DA to do so even if authorized. //// 137.553 Allows judge to authorize use of citations to secure appearance of probation violators. 137.655 Provides for the authorization of criminal justice grants by the Oregon Criminal Justice Council. 144.334 Provides authorization for use of citations by the State Board of Parole and Post-Prison Supervision or its designated representative to require appearance of parole or post-prison supervision violators. 146.117 Authorizes district attorney or medical examiner to order autopsy. 162.155 Defines escape in the second degree as being absent from or failing to return to this state without authorization of the Psychiatric Security Review Board. 164.270 Requires written authorization from owner to operate or ride a motor-propelled vehicle upon privately owned premises when the premises are posted. 164.377 This is the statute in question. It does not designate the source or type of authorization required in any way. 165.002(6) Defines to "falsely alter" a written instrument as changing it so that it appears to be the work of its ostensible maker, or authorized by its ostensible maker, when it is not. 165.671 Provides for a defense to certain civil or criminal actions where there is a good faith reliance on a court order, a legislative authorization or a statutory authorization. ////// 166.635(e)(D)(2) Allows forfeiting agency to destroy forfeited firearms or controlled substances with written authorization from district attorney. 167.312(f) Prohibits possession or use of equipment or animals reasonably believed to have been obtained by theft or deception from an animal research facility or without the authorization of an animal research facility. 169.046 Allows sheriff to authorize release of inmates to adhere to jail capacity limit and action plan. 171.740 Requires that an official authorization to lobby be signed by an officer of each such public agency, corporation, association, organization or other group or by each individual by whom the lobbyist is employed or in whose interest the lobbyist appears or works. 176.800 Provides that nothing in ORS 176.750 to 176.815 is intended as a delegation of legislative responsibility for the appropriation or authorization of expenditure of public funds. 179.520 Legislative authority giving superintendents or state agencies power to receive moneys deposited with the superintendents or state agencies for medical care or assistance of residents, moneys derived from athletic activities, any other moneys received by the superintendents or state agencies that are not required by law to be credited to other state funds or accounts. 180.235 Legislative authorization allowing Attorney General to hire outside counsel where a conflict of interests arises. 181.610 Defines, for purposes of ORS 181.610 to 181.690, "commissioned" to mean an authorization granting the power to perform various acts or duties of a police officer and acting under the supervision and responsibility of a county sheriff. 182.375 Authorizes the Oregon Department of Administrative Services to utilize the Oregon State Productivity Improvement Revolving Fund. 192.105 Provides for the state archivist to dispose of records at the request of public officials. 192.170 Provides for the disposition of certain public records without state archivist authorization. 192.557 Provides for the disclosure of certain confidential records to the Department of Human Resources. 192.560 Allows customer of financial institution to authorize disclosure of financial records to state or local agencies. 192.575 Limits liability of financial institution for disclosure if disclosure was authorized by customer or a court. 192.660 Authorizes the governing body of a public body to hold executive sessions. 194.010 Empowers Secretary of State to authorize and commission notaries public. 196.575 Authorizes LCDC to obtain federal oceanographic data and participate in joint liaison program on behalf of the State of Oregon with the States of Washington, California, Alaska and Hawaii. ////// 196.800(6) Defines, for purposes of ORS 196.600 to 196.905, "General authorization" as meaning a rule adopted by the director of LCDC, authorizing, without a permit from the division, a category of activities involving removal or fill, or both, on a statewide or other geographic basis. 221.621 Provides for disincorporation of cities, allows authorization by election after petition is filed. 221.650 Provides for transfer of property of disincorporated city to county after surrender of charter authorized by voters. ORS 224.310 to 224.420 Provides, among other things, for the legislative validation of sewer bonds issued by municipalities of less than 3500 people. 237.053 Allows school district to issue bonds after authorization by voters. 243.135(4) Allows public employer to make payroll deductions for employee medical expenses not payable by state if authorized, in writing, by the employee. 243.185 Legislative authorization for transfer of moneys from General Fund for payment of costs of health benefit plans, subject to legislative budgetary approval. 243.250 Legislative authorization for State Public Employee's Retirement Board to contract for health benefits. Subsection (4) requires written authorization from employee for payroll deductions. 243.726(4)(a) Prohibits labor organization from authorization of illegal strike by public employees. 261.007 Legislative authorization for formation of Public Utility Districts, implementing Article XI, Section 12 of state constitution. 261.113 Provides for petition or resolution for voter authorization of formation of PUD's. 261.200 Provides for voter-authorized proclamation of PUD district and imposition of special levy, establishment of boundaries of district. 261.355(10) Requires voter authorization of revenue bonds. 261.705 Requires voter authorization for dissolution of PUD. 264.360 Legislative authorization permitting water districts to enter into cooperative agreements with each other providing for the joint acquisition, construction, ownership, use or control of facilities. 267.302 Restricts means for financing mass transit districts to those authorized by legislature. 267.615 Requires voter authorization of mass transit district financing. 286.033 Allows issuance of Private Activity Bonds after authorization by resolution of governing body of state agency. 286.061 Legislative authorization of use of facsimile signatures on state bonds. 291.326 Validates allocation, authorization or approval by Emergency Board if 10 members or more were present. 291.328 Empowers Emergency Board to require justification before granting any authorization. 292.043 Allows state employee to withdraw authorization for payroll deduction in writing at any time. 292.053 Allows state employee to give and/or withdraw written authorization for payroll deduction to pay off loan from State Department of Veteran's Affairs. 292.065 Allows state officer or employee of a state agency to give written authorization for payroll deduction of parking fees. Authorization may be withdrawn in writing. 294.311(3) Defines, for purposes of ORS 294.305 to 294.520, 294.555 and 294.565, "Appropriation" to mean an authorization granted by the governing body (of a county or municipality) to make expenditures and to incur obligations for specific purposes, and limited to a single fiscal year. 305.230 Requires written authorization from taxpayer for attorney representing taxpayer before Department of Revenue. 319.611 Requires valid authorization from Public Utility Commission before using fuel pursuant to user's license (ORS 319.550). 323.180 Requires distributor of cigarette tax stamps or meter register settings to give written authorization to agents. ////// 351.067 Allows authorization by State Board of Higher Education of receipt of compensation for any officer or employee of the State System of Higher Education from private or public resources, requires report of potential conflict of interest in writing. 351.140 Legislative authorization to State Board of Higher Education to purchase real estate. 351.310 Allows State Board of Higher Education to authorize, among other things, individuals to sign vouchers for the disbursement of funds for the various institutions, departments and activities. 351.638(2) Allows State Board of Higher Education to deposit funds from private sources to the Faculty Recruitment Fund without prior authorization of the appropriate legislative review agency. 354.685 Allows translator district means to finance the acquisition, purchase, lease, operation or maintenance of the district when authorized by its electors. 358.360 Requires authorization of both statute and governing body for museum commission to advertise for bids for the construction of a proposed museum. 366.915 Legislative authorization to remove Crooked River Highway from state highway system and establish new route. 376.620 Permits maintenance and operation of skyline, high lead logging line, ferry skyline or cable footbridge across any navigable river, bay, inlet or other navigable waters within the state if authorized by the Division of State Lands. 396.515(3) Requires federal authorization for state restrictions on armory property jointly owned or state owned but subject to federal restrictions. 401.145(2) Requires authorization of the affected political subdivision, corporation, organization, or individual before removal of debris or wreckage during disaster or emergency. 412.570 Legislative authorization to obtain information concerning the applicant's training, experience, capacity for employment and any other material facts which may be required by the rules of the Adult and Family Services Division when there is an application for aid due to blindness or disability. 414.051 Provides for approval or denial of prior authorization requests for dental services by the Department of Human Resources. 414.153 Legislative authorization for state to pay, through county health services, for certain point of contact health services. 418.470 Legislative authorization for CSD to pay for shelter-care homes. 426.190 Requires transportation and hospitalization, upon execution of proper documents indicating emergency and authorization by county health officer or deputy, of mentally ill person. 426.233 Permits certain actions by a community mental health and developmental disabilities program director operating under ORS 430.610 to 430.700 or a designee thereof and acting on authorization of a county governing body. 428.220(2) Allows the Mental Health and Developmental Disability Services Division to give written authorization for admission to a state hospital under certain circumstances. 428.230 Allows the Mental Health and Developmental Disability Services Division to give written authorization for the return to a state hospital of a resident of Oregon who has been committed by a court of competent jurisdiction to a foreign hospital. 428.270 Provides for liability of any person, except an officer, agent or employee of a common carrier acting in the line of duty, who brings or in any way aids in bringing into this state any patient without the written authorization of the Mental Health and Developmental Disability Services Division. 431.065(2) Provides for written authorization from Assistant Director for Health for employees to be custodian of records within any of the administrative units of the Health Division. 431.412 Requires the governing body of any county to establish a county board of health when authorized by a majority of electors of the county at any general or special election. 432.317 Legislative authorization for final disposition of body. Requires written authorization from physician or medical examiner who certifies the cause of death. Requires authorization from state registrar for disinternment and reinternment. 441.061 Allows the Assistant Director for Senior and Disabled Services to grant specific authorization to any county or district board of health to administer and enforce any law or rules of the Senior and Disabled Services Division relating to inspections and issuance, revocation and suspension of licenses, or portion thereof, for long term care facilities. 445.070 Allows Senior and Disabled Services Division, in it sole discretion, to authorize the supplying of additional care to the indigent patient injured in a motor vehicle accident and pay for the same from the Motor Vehicle Accident Fund. ////// 450.925 Authorizes governing body of sanitary district to issue refunding bonds without election. 455.040 Requires local building codes to conform to state building code unless municipality authorized by the Director of the Department of Consumer and Business Services to deviate therefrom. 455.770 Permits the Director of the Department of Consumer and Business Services to issue subpoenas with the authorization of the Attorney General. 456.370 Enables any city or county to assist in the development of housing projects, and to authorize such assistance by ordinance of the governing body. 456.445 Legislative authorization for a housing authority to undertake the development or administration of projects to assure the availability of safe and sanitary dwellings for persons engaged in national defense activities and for a housing authority to cooperate with, or act as agent for, the Federal Government in the development or administration of similar projects by the Federal Government. 456.655 Provides for issue of housing finance bonds, authorization by State Treasurer and the director of the Housing and Community Services Department. 458.440 Requires written authorization of state agency executing lease in case of lease of certain state properties. 461.700 Requires applicant to state lottery to submit written authorization for disclosure of information. ////// 462.700 Legislative authorization for off-race course mutuel wagering. 464.360 Limitations on legislative authorization for organization to conduct bingo or lotto operation. 466.086 Permits the Environmental Quality Commission and the Department of Environmental Quality to secure federal authorization for a hazardous waste regulatory program under the provisions of the Federal Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, P.L. 94-580 and the Hazardous and Solid Waste Amendments of 1984, P.L. 98-616 as amended, and federal regulations and interpretive and guidance documents issued pursuant to the Federal Resource Conservation and Recovery Act. 466.100 Requires authorization of the Department of Environmental Quality for hazardous waste disposal. 475.805 Requires authorization from a physician, parent or legal guardian before providing a hypodermic device to a minor. 478.260 Permits Rural Fire Protection Districts to authorize operation of ambulance service and participate in intergovernmental agreements with other units of government to provide emergency medical services. 480.647(2) Prohibits the Board of Boiler Rules from requiring the adoption of "R" stamp provisions of the National Board of Inspection Code or the American Society of Mechanical Engineers Certification of Authorization requirements related to boilers for welding on nonboiler external piping. 480.647(3) Requires the board to accept an "R" stamp certification by the National Board of Inspection Code or the American Society of Mechanical Engineers Certification of Authorization as meeting the requirements of subsection (1) of this section and may accept any other quality control program for welding that is at least equivalent to the Oregon quality control procedures adopted under subsection (1) of this section. 517.840(d) Subjects rules adopted by the State Department of Geology and Mineral Industries to existing rights under any permit, license, lease or other valid authorization granted or issued by a governmental entity. 522.215 Requires authorization of Geothermal Heating District to abandon or otherwise stop drilling geothermal well. 523.060 Legislative authorization for Geothermal Heating Districts to enter into cooperative agreements and to issue and sell general obligation, revenue or refunding bonds . 532.130 Prohibits having or taking in tow or into custody or possession or under control, without the authorization of the owner of a registered mark or brand thereon, any forest products or booming equipment having thereupon a mark or brand registered as required by law. 537.040 Requires a public agency applying to register a water use to provide written authorization from the owner of the perfected or certificated water right that allows the public agency to use water from the conveyance or storage facility. 537.140(E) Requires each application for a permit to appropriate water to set forth a statement declaring the existence of written authorization or an easement permitting access to land crossed by the proposed ditch, canal or other work. 540.720 Prohibits use of water without authorization from person entitled to the water. 543.530 Legislative authorization of Water Resources Commission, limitation on issuance of stocks, bonds etc. 545.002 Establishes voting rights in irrigation districts, allows multiple owners to authorize one of their number to vote for all. Allows corporation to vote as a single landowner when written authorization filed with the secretary of the board of directors of the district. 545.144 Allows governing board of Irrigation District to accept, on behalf of the district, appointment of the district as fiscal agent of the United States, or authorization of the district by the United States to make collections of money for or on behalf of the United States in connection with any federal reclamation project. 545.144 Legislative authorization of sale of property, excess water, or hydroelectric power by irrigation district. 545.192 Legislative authorization election to authorize the issuance of bonds by irrigation district. 545.230 Requires election to authorize the issuance of bonds by irrigation district. 545.482 Legislative authorization of method for levying and collecting assessments or charges by irrigation district. 548.105 Legislative authorization of directors of drainage district to maintain proceedings for judicial determination as to organization of district and other matters. 548.330 Requires all bonds of any irrigation or drainage district authorized or issued by the district in the manner provided for by law. ////// 553.640 Permits the board of any water control district to sell bonds which have been authorized by the electors. Permits board to cancel bonds which have not been sold but prohibits replacement without voter authorization. 554.019 Requires authorization by Secretary of State for existence of corporations for irrigation, drainage, water supply or flood control district. 561.160 Requires approval of vouchers withdrawing money from state treasury by the director or by some person in the department authorized by the director to approve such vouchers, which authorization shall be in writing and filed with the Secretary of State. 568.870 Allows county court to authorize inspector to control erosion. Permits verbal authorization. 571.105 Requires written authorization from agent's principal before issuance of agent's license by Department of Agriculture ("agent" means any person only soliciting orders in this state for the purchase or sale of nursery stock for any principal who is not licensed). 604.061 Requires written authorization from owner or person in lawful possession of cattle before cattle may be transported from the premises of owner. 652.610(3) Requires voluntary, written authorization from employee for employer to withhold or divert any portion of employee wages. 653.755 Requires voluntary, written authorization from employee for deduction from wages of employee contribution to health plan. 654.082 Prohibits use of equipment without red warning notice, removal of red warning notice without authorization of director of the Department of Consumer and Business Services. 656.016(2) Requires an worker's compensation insurer to obtain authorization from Worker's Compensation Board. 656.245 Allows medical services by providers with authorization of attending physician. 656.325 Requires authorization by the director of Worker's Compensation Board for more than three examinations. 661.220 Prohibits use or display of the genuine label, trademark, term, design, device or form of advertisement of any person, association or union in any manner not authorized by such person, union or association. 672.135 Allows State Board of Engineering Examiners to issue temporary authorization to practice engineering. ////// 673.134 Requires authorization from State Board of Accountancy and Secretary of State to transact business as certified public accountants or of public accountants if a business form organized in another state. 675.571 Legislative authorization for State Board of Clinical Social Workers to collect fees, etc. 679.020 Requires authorization from State Board of Dentistry to practice dentistry or conduct dental office. 680.505 Prohibits practice of denturism without authorization from Health Division. 686.130 Prohibits the dispensing or giving to anyone live culture or attenuated live virus vaccine to be administered by a layman without providing instruction as to its administration and use and without prior written authorization from the State Veterinarian. 689.525 Legislative authorization for filling of out-of-state prescriptions, limitations. 696.359 Legislative authorization for another to control real estate broker's business, limitations. Requires written authorization by broker. 697.652 Limits on right of debt consolidation agency to cancel contract with client without written authorization of client. 707.350 Allows institution to increase or decrease capital stock with authorization of the Director of the Department of Consumer and Business Services. 707.752 Allows institution to pay for or reimburse the reasonable expenses incurred by a director if authorized by a provision in the articles of incorporation, or bylaws, by a resolution of the shareholders or board of directors or by contract. 708.272 Legislative authorization for banking institution to issue convertible capital debentures. 708.430 Allows an institution to invest assets in the capital stock of another corporation if authorized by resolution of the board of directors of the institution and by the written approval of the director. 713.190 Allows service of process on agent or director of foreign institution or extranational institution authorized by Secretary of State to do business in this state. 716.920(12) Legislative authorization for foreign bank or holding company to own or control bank. 723.676 Allows authorization by board of directors of liquidating credit union for necessary expenses of business during liquidation. Requires vote of members to authorize liquidation. 725.355 Allows authorization by employee for payroll deduction for payment of debt if authorization is revocable. 731.356 Requires authorization by the Director of the Department of Consumer and Business Services to act as an insurer. 731.442 Legislative authorization of business on mutual assessment plan, limitations. ////// 733.740 Requires insurer to make written record of investments, signed by person authorized by board of directors to do so. 742.504 Requires authorization from injured person for release of medical information to insurer. 744.227 Allows Director of the Department of Consumer and Business Services to revoke authorization to keep certificate of deposit in lieu of trust account. 746.630 Prescribes content of forms for authorization by insured of disclosure of private or privileged information by insurer. 746.665 Prohibits disclosure of personal or privileged information about individual without written authorization of that individual. 748.177 Legislative authorization to do business as mutual life insurance company. 757.245 Requires authorization of PUC for establishment of joint rates by public utilities. 757.259 Requires authorization by PUC to include amortization schedule in rates of public utility. 757.410 Requires authorization by PUC for issuance of securities by public utility. 759.050 Permits PUC to regulate competitive zone telecommunication service. 759.195 Provides for PUC authorization of price listing by telecommunications service. 759.310 Requires authorization by PUC for issuance of securities by telecommunications utility. 760.140 Requires authorization of PUC for railroad to use concentration, commodity, transit and other special contract rates. 760.170 Allows railroad to meet rates of other railroad without authorization by PUC. 819.110 Allows removal of vehicle parked or left standing upon any public way for a period in excess of 24 hours without authorization by statute or local ordinance. 822.075 Prohibits removal of notice without authorization of Department of Transportation. 822.220 Legislative authorization for driver of wrecker or tow truck to block traffic under certain circumstances. 823.020 Provides for authorization of training of ambulance personnel by Health Division. 823.160 Provides for denial, suspension or revocation of license and emergency medical technician certificate of ambulance or ambulance service if medical aid rendered by persons not authorized by Health Division to do so. 823.205 Requires authorization from Board of Medical Examiners for the State of Oregon for practicing physician to oversee personnel rendering emergency aid. 830.375 Requires authorization of State Marine Board before holding a regatta, boat race, marine parade, tournament or exhibition on the waters of this state. 836.220 Requires voter authorization for issuance of bonds to build airport. 836.240 Legislative authorization for municipality to budget and levy taxes to maintain and operate airport.